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Abstract
The paper proposes a logical systematization of the notion of counts-as which is grounded on a very simple intuition about
what counts-as statements actually mean, i.e., forms of classification. Moving from this analytical thesis the paper disentangles
three semantically different readings of statements of the type “X counts as Y in context c”, from the weaker notion of contextual
classification to the stronger notion of constitutive rule. These many ways in which counts-as can be said are formally addressed
by making use of modal logic techniques. The resulting framework allows for a formal characterization of all the involved notions
and their reciprocal logical relationships.
© 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
The term “counts-as” derives from the paradigmatic formulation that in [26] and [27] is attributed to the non-
regulative component of institutions, i.e., constitutive rules:
[. . .] “institutions” are systems of constitutive rules. Every institutional fact is underlain by a (system of) rule(s) of
the form “X counts as Y in context C” [26, pp. 51–52].
In legal theory the non-regulative component of normative systems has been labeled in ways that emphasize a classifi-
catory, as opposed to a normative or regulative, character: conceptual rules [4], qualification norms [23], definitional
norms [17]. Constitutive rules are definitional in character:
“The rules for checkmate or touchdown must ‘define’ checkmate in chess or touchdown in American Football”
[26, p. 43].
Considering this feature, a first reading of counts-as is readily available: it is plain that counts-as statements express
classifications. For example, they express what is classified to be a checkmate in chess, or a touchdown in American
Football. However, is this all that is involved in the meaning of counts-as statements?
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in the label “constitutive rule”, that is, the notion of constitution. Aim of the paper is to show that this notion, as
it is presented in some work in legal and social theory, is amenable to formal characterization and that the theory
we developed in [15,16] provides a ground for its understanding. The paper disentangles and analyzes three precise
senses in which it can be said that “X counts as Y in context c”. For each of these different senses of counts-as a
formal semantics is developed by making use of standard modal logic techniques. From a methodological point of
view, we will proceed as recommended here:
“[. . . ] it seems to me obvious that the only rational approach to such problems would be the following: [1] We
should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different
concepts which are denoted by one word; [2] we should try to make these concepts as clear as possible (by means of
definition, or of an axiomatic procedure, or in some other way); [3] to avoid further confusions, we should agree to
use different terms for different concepts; and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all concepts
involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual relations” [29, p. 355].
The structure of the paper reflects its method. Section 2 disentangles three different meanings of counts-as statements
and exposes a first informal analysis. In Section 3 a modal logic of contextual classification is introduced and by means
of it a formal analysis of the classificatory view of counts-as is provided. The two remaining senses of counts-as are
formally analyzed in Sections 5 and 6. Finally, the relationships between the three readings are studied in Section 7.
Conclusions follow in Section 8 and Appendix A proves soundness and completeness of the logics deployed in the
formal analysis.
2. Counts-as between classification and constitution
Consider the following reasoning pattern.
Example 1. It is a rule of normative system Γ that conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles; it
is always the case that bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods but not that bikes count as vehicles;
therefore, in the context of normative system Γ , bikes count as vehicles.
This is an instance of a typical reasoning pattern involving constitutive rules. The counts-as locution occurs three
times. However, the second premise states a generally acknowledged classification (“bikes count as conveyances
transporting people or goods”), while the conclusion states a classification which is considered to hold only with
respect to the normative system at issue (“according to normative system Γ , bikes count as vehicles”). The first
premise expresses something yet different, a classification which is brought about—constituted—by the normative
system: “conveyances transporting people or goods are classified as vehicles” is one of the rules of Γ .
2.1. The classificatory reading of counts-as
The fact that “bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods” can be readily analyzed as a form of
classification: the concept ‘bike’ is a subconcept of the concept ‘conveyance transporting people or goods’ [12,13,15].
Notice that this reading is aligned with the informal analysis of counts-as advanced in [18]:
“There are usually constraints within any institution according to which certain states of affairs of a given type
count as, or are to be classified as, states of affairs of another given type” [18, p. 431].
In Example 1, one of the premises was that bikes do not always count as vehicles. In other words, there are contexts
in which ‘bike’ is not a subconcept of ‘vehicle’. This suggests that a notion of context is necessary because classi-
fications holding for a normative system are not of a universal kind, they do not hold in general. As a consequence,
the classificatory reading of counts-as statements of the form “X counts-as Y in context c” runs as follows: “X is
a subconcept of Y in context c”. Following much literature on context theory (see for instance [9,28]) we conceive
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considered a context will be clarified discussing the notion of constitutive rule (Section 2.3).
Classificatory counts-as will be formally studied in Section 3. A more extensive discussion of the intuitions under-
pinning the classificatory reading of counts-as statements can be found in [15,16].
2.2. Counts-as statements as proper classifications
The analytic literature on constitutive norms often emphasizes the following characteristic feature: counts-as state-
ments are not just classifications but “new” classifications, that is, classifications which would not hold without the
normative system stating them:
“Where the rule is purely regulative, behaviour which is in accordance with the rule could be given the same
description or specification (the same answer to the question “What did he do?”) whether or not the rule existed,
provided the description or specification makes no explicit reference to the rule. But where the rule (or system
of rules) is constitutive, behaviour which is in accordance with the rule can receive specifications or descriptions
which it could not receive if the rule did not exist” [26, p. 35].
This was the case for the conclusion of the inference in Example 1: “in the context of normative system Γ , bikes
count as vehicles” although this is not generally the case. In this view, counts-as statements do not only state contextual
classifications, but they state new classifications which would not otherwise hold.
Observation 1. Counts-as statements are classifications which hold with respect to a context (set of situations) but
which do not hold in general (i.e., with respect to all situations).
We call counts-as statements, intended in the sense of Observation 1, proper contextual classifications. In other
words, X counts as Y in context c because X is classified as Y in c but also because this does not hold in general, i.e.,
in the global context. They state that something new is brought about and in this sense the notion of proper contextual
classification already captures a precise notion of constitution: the fact that X is classified as Y is constituted by
context c in the sense that out of context c it might not hold. Proper contextual classifications will be formally studied
in Sections 4.1 5. A more detailed exposition of the intuitions behind the proper classificatory view on counts-as can
be found in [16].
2.3. Counts-as statements as constitutive rules
Example 1 sketched an inference grounded on a constitutive rule: “It is a rule of normative system Γ that con-
veyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles”. First of all, this statement expresses a classification which
is brought about by the normative system Γ (“conveyances transporting people or goods count as vehicles”), that is,
what we called in the previous section a proper contextual classification. There is however something more. It explic-
itly states that a classification is one of the rules of Γ . This semantic ingredient is not captured by the classificatory
and proper classificatory readings sketched in the previous sections and it involves two essential aspects.
The first one is that counts-as statements of the constitutive type are always part of a set of similar statements, the
system of rules Γ .
“Rules are constitutive if and only if they are part of a set of rules. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a rule
that is constitutive in isolation” [24, p. 5].
That is to say, a constitutive rule is constitutive only in as much it is part of that set. It is worth stressing how close this
consideration lies to the warning raised in [20]: “no logic of norms without attention to a system of which they form
part”.
The second aspect concerns the relation between, on the one hand, the notion of a set of rules Γ , i.e., a normative
system or institution, and on the other hand the notion of set of situations c, or context c. A Γ constitutes a context
c by means of its rules. The set of classifications stated as constitutive rules by a normative system (for instance,
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that set of classifications true. Hence, the set of constitutive rules of any normative system can be seen as a set of
situations. And a set of situations is what is called a context in much literature on context theory (see for instance
[9,28]).
To put it shortly, a context is a set of situations, and if the constitutive rules of a given normative system Γ are
satisfied by all and only the situations in a given set, then that set of situations is the context defined by Γ . This simple
observation allows us to think of contexts as “systems of constitutive rules” [26, p. 51]. Notice that this is no exotic
thought. In fact, this idea has been neatly advanced—informally—in some literature on the theory of institutions:
“A set of constitutive rules defines a logical space” [24, p. 6].
A logical space is nothing but a set of states, i.e., a context. Getting back to Example 1, consider the statement
concluding the argument: “according to Γ , bikes count as vehicles”. In this light such a statement just says that “in
the set of situations defined by the rules of system Γ , bike is a subconcept of vehicle”.
The discussion above is distilled in the following observation.
Observation 2. A constitutive counts-as statement is a proper contextual classification such that: (a) it is an element
of the set of rules specifying a given normative system Γ ; (b) the set of rules of Γ define the context (set of situations)
to which the counts-as statement pertains.
Constitutive counts-as statements will be formally studied in Sections 4.2 and 6.
To recapitulate, we distinguished between constitutive counts-as statements, proper classificatory counts-as state-
ments and classificatory counts-as statements. When statements “X counts as Y in the context c of normative system
Γ ” are read as constitutive rules, what is meant is that the classification of X under Y is considered to be an explicit
promulgation of the normative system Γ defining context c. Instead, when they are read as proper classificatory state-
ments they are meant to denote classifications that are constituted, or brought about, by the context at issue in the sense
that they might not hold with respect to another context. Finally, when they are read as mere contextual classification,
they are meant to denote classificatory statements that are just the case in the given context.
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, it is worth noting that some literature on legal theory considers counts-
as statements to be special kinds of constitutive rules and rejects a full identification between constitutive rules and
counts-as statements. For example, [25] considers counts-as statements to typically concern the constitution of state-
of-affairs which have no duration (e.g., committing a crime) while constitutive rules concern the constitution of state-
of-affairs with duration, i.e., which can start and cease to hold (e.g., being a citizen). This is of course a terminological
matter, and we chose to solve it by sticking to the Searlean view, where the identification “constitutive rule = counts-
as” is quite clearly stated. Besides, it should also be said that, in order to introduce such a distinction between counts-as
and constitutive rules, distinctions should also be introduced which allow to distinguish the specific nature of the X
and Y terms occurring in the rules. The propositional logic setting assumed here abstracts from such distinctions by
viewing X and Y simply as propositions whose further logical structure is left unspecified.
3. Modal logic of classificatory counts-as
This section summarizes the results presented in [15]. We first introduce the languages we are going to work with:
propositional n-modal languages Ln [2]. The alphabet of Ln contains: an at most countable set P of propositional
atoms p; the set of boolean connectives {¬,∧,∨,→}; a finite non-empty set of n context indexes C, and the operators
[ ] and 〈 〉. Metavariables i, j, . . . are used for denoting elements of C. The set of well formed formulae φ of Ln is
then defined by the following BNF:
φ ::=  | p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1 → φ2 | [i]φ | 〈i〉φ.
We will refer to formulae in which at least one modal operator occurs as modalized formulae. Modalized formulae
in which all non-logical symbols occur in the scope of a modal operator are called contextual formulae. Formulae in
which no modal operator occurs are called instead objective, and we denote them using the metavariables γ1, γ2, . . . .
196 D. Grossi et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 6 (2008) 192–2173.1. Semantics
Semantics for these languages is given via structures M= 〈F ,I〉, where:
– F is a CXT frame, i.e., a structure F = 〈W, {Wi}i∈C〉, where W is a finite set of states (possible worlds) and
{Wi}i∈C is a family of subsets of W .1
– I is an evaluation function I :P −→ P(W) associating to each atom the set of states which make it true.
Such frames model thus n different contexts i which might be inconsistent, if the corresponding set Wi is empty,
or global if Wi coincides with W itself. This implements in a straightforward way the thesis developed in context
modeling according to which contexts can be soundly represented as sets of possible worlds [28].
The satisfaction relation results in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Satisfaction based on CXT frames). Let M be a model built on a CXT frame.
M,w |= [i]φ iff ∀ w′ ∈ Wi : M,w′  φ
M,w |= 〈i〉φ iff ∃w′ ∈ Wi : M,w′  φ.
The obvious boolean clauses are omitted. Validity in a model, in a frame and in a class of frames are defined as usual.
It is instructive to make a remark about the [i]-operator clause, which can be seen as the characterizing feature of
the modeling of contexts as sets of worlds.2 It states that the truth of a modalized formula abstracts from the point
of evaluation of the formula. In other words, the notion of “truth in a context i” is a global notion: [i]-formulae are
either true in every state in the model or in none. This reflects the idea that what is true or false in a context does not
depend on the world of evaluation, and this is what we would intuitively expect especially for contexts interpreted as
normative systems: what holds in the context of a given normative system is not determined by the point of evaluation
but just by the system in itself, i.e., by its rules: the fact that in Γ bikes count as vehicles depends only on the rules
of Γ .
3.2. Axiomatics
The multi-modal logic that corresponds, i.e., that is sound and complete with respect to the class of CXT frames, is
a system we call here K45ijn . It consists of a logic weaker than the logic KD45
ij
n investigated in [15] since the semantic
constraint has been dropped which required the sets in family {Wi}i∈C to be non-empty. As a consequence the D axiom
has been eliminated. To put it in a nutshell, the system is the very same logic for contextual classification developed
in [15] except for the fact the we want to allow here the representation of empty contexts as well. In the knowledge
representation setting we are working in, where contexts can be identified with the normative systems defining them,
this amounts to accept the possibility of normative systems issuing inconsistent constitutive rules.
Logic K45ijn is axiomatized via the following axioms and rules schemata:
(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
(K) [i](φ1 → φ2) →
([i]φ1 → [i]φ2)
(4ij ) [i]φ → [j ][i]φ
(5ij ) ¬[i]φ → [j ]¬[i]φ
(Dual) 〈i〉φ ↔ ¬[i]¬φ
1 We call these structures frames even though, technically speaking, they are not since they only implicitly contain accessibility relations. In
effect, they are just multi-sets, or bags, of subsets of the domain W .
2 Propositional logics of context without this clause are investigated in [5,6].
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(N) φ/[i]φ
where i, j denote elements of the set of indexes C. The system is a multi-modal homogeneous K45 with the two
interaction axioms 4ij and 5ij . Soundness and completeness are proven in Appendix A.
A remark is in order especially with respect to axiomata 4ij and 5ij. In fact, what the two schemata do, consists
in making the nesting of the operators reducible which, leaving technicalities aside, means that truth and falsehood
in contexts ([i]φ and ¬[i]φ) are somehow absolute because they remain invariant even if evaluated from another
context ([j ][i]φ and [j ]¬[i]φ). In other words, they express the fact that whether something holds in a context i is
not something that a context j can influence. This is indeed the kind of property to be expected given the semantics
presented in the previous section.
3.3. Classificatory counts-as formalized
Using a multi-modal logic K45ijn on a language MLn, the formal characterization of the classificatory view on
counts-as statements runs as follows.
Definition 2 (Classificatory counts-as: ⇒clc ). “γ1 counts as γ2 in context c” is formalized in a multi-modal language
MLn as the strict implication between two objective sentences γ1 and γ2 in logic K45ijn :
γ1 ⇒clc γ2 := [c](γ1 → γ2).
These properties for ⇒clc follow.
Proposition 1 (Properties of ⇒clc ). In logic K45ijn , the following formulas and rules are valid:
(1)γ2 ↔ γ3/(γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ↔ (γ1 ⇒clc γ3)
(2)γ1 ↔ γ3/(γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ↔ (γ3 ⇒clc γ2)
(3)((γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ∧ (γ1 ⇒clc γ3)) → (γ1 ⇒clc (γ2 ∧ γ3))
(4)((γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ∧ (γ3 ⇒clc γ2)) → ((γ1 ∨ γ3) ⇒clc γ2)
(5)γ ⇒clc γ
(6)(γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒clc γ3) → (γ1 ⇒clc γ3)
(7)(γ1 ⇒clc γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒clc γ1) → [c](γ1 ↔ γ2)
(8)(γ1 ⇒clc γ2) → (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒clc γ2)
(9)(γ1 ⇒clc γ2) → (γ1 ⇒clc γ2 ∨ γ3).
We omit the proofs, which are straightforward via application of Definition 2. This system validates all the intuitive
syntactic constraints isolated in [18] (validities (1)–(4). In addition, this semantic-oriented approach to classificatory
counts-as enables the four validities (6)–(9). Besides, this analysis shows that counts-as conditionals, once they are
viewed as conditionals of a classificatory nature, naturally satisfy reflexivity (5), transitivity (6), and a form of “con-
textualized” antisymmetry (7), strengthening of the antecedent (8) and weakening of the consequent (9).
4. Beyond classificatory counts-as
Aim of this section is to provide formal counterparts to Observations 1 and 2 which can work as intermediate step
towards the development of suitable modal logics for the analysis of proper classificatory counts-as (Section 5) and
constitutive counts-as (Section 6).
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As usual, model-theoretic considerations can give us crucial hints. Let us define the set T(X) of all formulae which,
given a model, are satisfied by all worlds in a set of worlds X:
T(X) = {φ | ∀w ∈ X: M,w |= φ}
and let T→(X) be the set of all implications between objective formulae γ1 and γ2 which are satisfied by all worlds
in a set of worlds X:
T
→(X) = {γ1 → γ2 | ∀w ∈ X: M,w |= γ1 → γ2}.
Obviously, for every X: T→(X) ⊆ T(X). In the classificatory reading, given a model M where the set of worlds
Wc ⊆ W models context c, the set of all classificatory counts-as statements holding in c, which we denote as CL(Wc),
can be defined as the set T→(Wc):
CL(Wc) := T→(Wc).
Hence, it is easy to see that: T→(W) ⊆ CL(Wc) ⊆ T(Wc). In other words, the set of classificatory counts-as statements
is: a subset of all the truths of Wc; a superset of all conditional truths of W , that is, of the “global” or “universal” context
of model M.
While the first point represents a quite banal semantic constraint to which any formal characterization of counts-as
should adhere, the second one is much more questionable. Indeed, what is true anyway is not characteristic of any
context (except of the global one), and it cannot be properly said to represent any new truth. In other words, interpreting
counts-as statements as mere classifications, as it has been done in Section 3 make them inherit all trivial classifications
which hold globally in the model. This is the reason why classificatory counts-as, as shown in Proposition 1, behaves
in a classical way enjoying antecedent strengthening as well as transitivity and reflexivity.
These considerations suggest a strategy for specifying the set of proper classificatory counts-as holding in a context
c on the basis of T→(Wc). The problem boils down to eliminate from the set of classificatory counts-as CL for a
context Wc those classifications which hold globally, that is, which hold with respect to the global context W . We
obtain, in this way, the set of proper classificatory counts-as statements, or proper contextual classifications, holding
in context c in a CXT model M.
Definition 3 (Set of proper classificatory counts-as in c). The set CL+(Wc) of proper classificatory counts-as state-
ments of a context c in a CXT model M is defined as follows:
(10)CL+(Wc) := T→(Wc)\T(W).
Intuitively, the set of proper classificatory count-as holding in c corresponds to the set of implications between
objective formulae which hold in c, minus those implications which hold universally. Or, to put it otherwise, the set of
proper classificatory count-as holding in c corresponds to the set of classificatory counts as of c, minus those implica-
tions which hold universally: CL+(Wc) := CL(Wc)\T(W). This is the most natural amendment of the classificatory
view toward the specification of a stronger notion of contextual classification along the lines of Observation 1.
4.2. From proper classification to constitution
Let us now focus on Observation 2. What plays a role there is the notion of a defn of the context of a counts-as
statement. A definition of a context c, in a CXT model M, is a set of objective formulae3 Γ such that ∀w ∈ W :
(11)M,w |= Γ iff w ∈ Wc
that is, the set of formulae Γ such that all and only the worlds in Wc satisfy Γ in M.
3 This is no arbitrary choice since it can be easily seen that contextual formulae, since they denote global properties of the models, are as a matter
of fact irrelevant for the definition of sets of worlds Wi such that ∅ ⊂ Wi ⊂ W , that is, those sets which denote neither the empty nor the universal
contexts. It is therefore natural to restrict definitions to objective formulae.
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Cxt Classification CL(Wc) = T→(Wc)




+(Wc) ∩ Γ, if Γ defines Wc
∅, otherwise.
Observation 2 can now get a formal formulation. Given the set of formulae Γ , we say that any formula γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ
is a constitutive counts-as statement w.r.t. context c iff Γ defines context c and γ1 → γ2 belongs to the set of proper
contextual classifications of c.
Definition 4 (Set of constitutive counts-as in c w.r.t. definition Γ ). The set CO(Γ,Wc) of constitutive counts-as
statements of a context c defined by Γ in a CXT model M is:
(12)CO(Γ,Wc) :=
{
γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ | γ1 → γ2 ∈ CL+(Wc) and ∀w(M,w |= Γ iff w ∈ Wc)
}
.
Notice that CO(Γ,Wc) is defined taking as domain the set of implicative statements of Γ . Notice also that, as a





+(Wc) ∩ Γ, if Γ defines Wc,
∅, otherwise.
Section 6 is devoted to the development of a modal logic based on this definition. The definitions discussed are
summarized in Table 1.
The table pinpoints the dependencies between the formal characterizations of the three different senses of counts-
as which has been taken into consideration: the notion of constitution builds on the notion of proper contextual
classification which in its turn builds on the notion of contextual classification. The modal logic analysis of contextual
classification developed in Section 3 can thus be used as a sound starting point for the modal logic analysis of the two
notions introduced in this section.
4.3. A methodological note
Before rendering the insights of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 in modal logic, it is worth making a methodological remark.
We are here concerned with a term, “counts-as”, which appears to have different meanings. At this point we had two
main ways to pursue the formal characterization of counts-as we were aiming at. We could proceed axiomatically by
trying to single out intuitive syntactic properties of counts-as statements. Or rather semantically, by trying to enrich the
semantic characterization of the classificatory counts-as exposed in the previous sections in order to capture further
semantic nuances. While formal approaches to counts-as [3,8,18] have been, up to now, characterized by an axiomatic
perspective, we have instead chosen for a semantics-driven solution. With axiomatics perspective we mean that the
formal analysis of counts-as proceeds, in those works, by singling out ‘intuitive’ axioms rather than trying to define
the to-be-analyzed notion in terms of better understood ones.4 This choice has been inspired by considering the
methodological standpoint of fundamental work in philosophical logic such as [29,30].
The same issue we are facing here in analyzing counts-as lies also at the ground of the Tarskian characterization
of the notion of truth and consists in the polysemy of the to-be-analyzed term. Because of the inherent polysemy of
the predicate “to be true”, Tarski found it unconvincing to proceed introducing the predicate as a primitive and then
axiomatizing it:
“[. . . ] the choice of axioms always has rather accidental character, depending on inessential factors (such as e.g.
the actual state of our knowledge). [. . . ] a method of constructing a theory does not seem to be very natural [. . . ] if
4 In [18] a formal semantics for the axiomatization of counts-as is provided. However, such semantics is of an abstract algebraic kind, which
means that it results in an isomorphic mirroring of the axiomatics. We have thoroughly analyzed the shortcomings of such a semantics in [16].
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by concepts which have led to various misunderstanding in the past” [30, pp. 405–406].
Instead, he preferred to first isolate a precise sense of the predicate, i.e., truth as correspondence to reality, and then to
define it in terms of a better understood notion, i.e., the notion of satisfaction of a formula by a model. An axiomatic
analysis of counts-as statements runs the danger alluded to in the quote: since it is not clear what counts-as statements
actually mean, an axiomatization of them could result in mixing under the same logical representation different se-
mantic flavors that, from an analytical point of view, should be kept separated. A systematic discussion of this issue,
specifically in relation with the proposal advanced in [18], can be found in [16].
The work presented in this paper is the result of the application of this method to the notion of counts-as: in
Section 2 we first disentangled different meanings of the term “counts-as” providing a first map of its polysemy; in
Section 3 we formally analyzed the first and more basic of these meanings explaining it in terms of a better-understood
notion (strict implication within a context); in this section we have pointed at a first semantic characterization of the
other two meanings and in the coming next two sections we will explain them by making use of better-understood
modal logic notions: the negation of global statements (proper classificatory counts-as) and the definition of a context
(constitutive counts-as).
5. Modal logic of counts-as as proper contextual classification
In the following section a modal logic is developed which implements the definition stated in Formula 10 above. By
doing this we will capture the intuitions discussed in Section 2 concerning the intuitive reading of counts-as statements
in proper classificatory terms. At the same time we will maintain the possible worlds semantics of context exposed in
Section 3 and developed in order to account for the purely classificatory view of counts-as.
5.1. Expansion of Ln and semantics
Language Ln is expanded as follows. The set of context indexes C is such that it always contains the special context
index u denoting the universal (or global) context. We call this language Lun.
Languages Lun are given a semantics via a special class of CXT frames, namely the class of CXT frames F =
〈W, {Wi}i∈C〉 such that W ∈ {Wi}i∈C . That is, the frames in this class, which we call CXT, always contain the global
context among their contexts. The definition of the satisfaction relation for language Lun follows.
Definition 5 (Satisfaction based on CXT frames). Let M be a model built on a CXT frame.
M,w |= [u]φ iff ∀w′ ∈ W : M,w′ |= φ
M,w |= [c]φ iff ∀w′ ∈ Wc: M,w′ |= φ
where u is the universal context index and c ranges on the context indexes in C. The obvious boolean clauses and the
clauses for the dual modal operators are omitted.
The new clause states that the [u] operator is interpreted on the universal 1-frame contained in each CXT frame.
It is therefore nothing but a S5 necessity operator.
5.2. Axiomatics
We call Cxtu the logic characterizing the class of CXT frames. Logic Cxtu results from the union K45ijn ∪S5u∪{⊆
.ui}, that is, from the union of K45ijn with the S5u logic for the [u] operator together with the interaction axiom ⊆ .ui
below. The axiomatics runs thus as follows:
(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
(Ki ) [i](φ1 → φ2) → ([i]φ1 → [i]φ2)
(4ij ) [i]φ → [j ][i]φ
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(Tu) [u]φ → φ
(⊆ .ui) [u]φ → [i]φ
(Dual) 〈i〉φ ↔ ¬[i]¬φ
(MP) IF  φ1 AND  φ1 → φ2 THEN  φ2
(Ni ) IF  φ THEN  [i]φ
where i, j denote elements of the set of indexes C and u denotes the universal context index in C. The interaction
axiom ⊆ .ui states something quite intuitive concerning the interaction of the [u] operator with all other context
operators: what holds in the global context, holds in every context. Soundness and completeness of this axiomatization
w.r.t. CXT frames are proven in Appendix A.
5.3. Proper classificatory counts-as formalized
Using a multi-modal logic Cxtu on a language Lun, the proper classificatory reading of counts-as statements can be
formalized as follows.
Definition 6 (Proper classificatory counts-as: ⇒cl+c ). “γ1 counts as γ2 in context c”, with γ1 and γ2 objective formu-
lae, is formalized in the logic Cxtu on a multi-modal language Lun as:
γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2 := [c](γ1 → γ2) ∧ ¬[u](γ1 → γ2).
Notice that this definition is nothing but the translation in the Lun language of Formula (10). What properties of
counts-as are lost interpreting it as proper contextual classification? And what properties are instead still valid? The
following two propositions answer these questions.
Proposition 2 (Properties of ⇒cl+c : invalidities). The ⇒cl+c versions of reflexivity, strengthening of the antecedent,
weakening of the consequent, transitivity and cautious monotonicity are invalid in CXT frames:
(13)γ ⇒cl+c γ
(14)(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) → (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒cl+c γ2)
(15)(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) → (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2 ∨ γ3)
(16)((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ3)) → (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3)
(17)((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3)) → ((γ1 ∧ γ2) ⇒cl+c γ3).
We do not provide all the proofs, which can be obtained by constructing appropriate countermodels. We show a
countermodel for Formula (16): ∀w ∈ W ,M,w |= γ1 → γ3; ∀w ∈ Wc,M,w |= γ1 → γ2 andM,w |= γ2 → γ3; and
∃w′,w′′ s.t. M,w′ |= γ1 ∧ ¬γ2 ∧ γ3 and M,w′′ |= ¬γ1 ∧ γ2 ∧ ¬γ3.
It might be instructive to provide, at this point, an intuitive example for the failure of transitivity. Consider a public
park regulation stating that self-propelled conveyances counts as (in the proper classificatory sense) vehicles, and
that vehicles count as (in the proper classificatory sense) self-propelled conveyances. It follows that self-propelled
conveyances counts as self-propelled conveyances, but this time, the counts-as can only be read in the classificatory
sense. In fact, being a self-propelled conveyance logically, and therefore globally, implies being a self-propelled
conveyance. Hence, such implication can not be a proper contextual classification.
Proposition 3 (Properties of ⇒cl+c : validities). In logic Cxtu the ⇒cl+c variants of Formulae (1)–(4) of Proposition 1
are valid:
(18)γ2 ↔ γ3/(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ↔ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3)
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(20)((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3)) → (γ1 ⇒cl+c (γ2 ∧ γ3))
(21)((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ3 ⇒cl+c γ2)) → ((γ1 ∨ γ3) ⇒cl+c γ2).
Contextualized antisymmetry, i.e., Formula (7) of Proposition 1 holds in the following form:
(22)(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ1) → [c](γ1 ↔ γ2) ∧ ¬[u](γ1 ↔ γ2)
Cumulative transitivity (alias cut) is also valid:
(23)((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ ((γ1 ∧ γ2) ⇒cl+c γ3)) → (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3)
Conditional versions of antecedent strengthening, consequent weakening and transitivity are valid:
(24)¬[u](γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2) →
(
(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) → (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒cl+c γ2)
)
(25)¬[u](γ1 → γ2 ∨ γ3) →
(
(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) → (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2 ∨ γ3)
)
(26)¬[u](γ1 → γ3) →
(
(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ3)
) → (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3)
We provide the deduction of Formula (24) as an example.
1. (P) (γ1 → γ2) → (γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2)
2. (N), (K), (MP),1 [c](γ1 → γ2) → [c](γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2)
3. (P) ¬[u](γ1 ∧ γ2 → γ3)
→ (¬[u](γ1 → γ3) → ¬[u](γ1 ∧ γ2 → γ3))
4. (P), (MP), (Definition 6),2,3 ¬[u](γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2)
→ ((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) → (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒cl+c γ2))
Propositions 2 and 3, although very simple, are of key importance for putting our characterization of counts-as as
proper contextual classification in perspective with other proposals. Such a comparison is elaborated in detail in [16].
Formulae (24)–(26) are also of interest since they show that some quite standard properties of contextual classifi-
cations are inherited by proper contextual classification in a conditionalized form, the condition being an assertion of
invalidity (¬[u]). Proper classificatory counts-as statements are still monotonic, provided that the strengthened ver-
sion of the antecedent does not universally imply the consequent. Similarly they are still transitive, provided that the
implication between γ1 and γ3 is not a validity of the model. It is worth emphasizing the importance of these results
from the perspective of conceptual analysis and their clarifying power. An alleged intuitive example of transitivity for
counts-as statements, in a proper classificatory sense, can be such only under an appropriate invalidity assertion.
6. Modal logic of constitutive counts-as
In this section a modal logic is developed which implements Definition 4. Again, the possible world semantics
developed in order to account for the classificatory view of counts-as lies at the ground of the proposed framework.
6.1. Expanding Lun
Language Lun, which has been used in the previous section to deal with proper contextual classification, needs now
further expansion. The language is expanded along two lines.
First, the set of context indexes C contains now a set K of m atomic indexes c among which the universal context
index u, and the set of the negations −c of the atomic contexts, i.e., of the elements of K: C = K ∪ {−c | c ∈ K}. The
cardinality n of C is therefore equal to 2m.
Second, the language needs also to contain an at most countable set N of nominals s disjoint from the set P of
propositional atoms. Nominals are names for states in the model or, in other words, formulae that can be satisfied by
only one state in the model. They can be freely combined with propositions to form well-formed formulae. The BNF
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φ ::=  | p | s | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | φ1 → φ2 | [i]φ | 〈i〉φ.
Metavariables for nominals are written as ν1, ν2, . . .. Modal languages containing nominals have recently been object
of thorough study and are known as hybrid languages [2]. The language obtained is called Lu,−n .
Nominals are chosen here in order to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic based on the
semantics presupposed by Definition 4. To be more precise, they are necessary in order to axiomatize the notion of
complement of a context.5 This will become evident by exposing the axiomatics (Section 6.3) and especially, from a
technical point of view, in proving its completeness (Appendix A).
6.2. Semantics
A semantics to language Lu,−n is given via a special class of CXT frames, namely the class of CXT frames F =
〈W, {Wi}i∈C〉 such that there always exists a u ∈ C s.t. Wu = W ; and such that for any atomic index c ∈ K there exists
−c ∈ C such that: W−c = Wu\Wc. That is, the frames in this class, which we call CXT,\, always contain the global
context among their contexts and the complement of every atomic context.
The semantics for Lu,−n is obtained interpreting the formulae on models built on CXT,\ frames. However, because
of the introduction of nominals, the evaluation function I should be redefined as a function I :P ∪ N −→ P(W)
satisfying the following constraints:
– For all nominals s ∈ N, I(s) is a singleton set, that is, nominals always denote one and only one state in the model.
– For all states w ∈ W , there exists a nominal s ∈ N such that I(s) = w, that is, each state has a name. In other
words, the restriction of the interpretation function I on the set of nominals (NI) is a surjection on the set of all
singletons of W .
Following [7], models with valuations satisfying the conditions above are called surjective models. The definition of
the satisfaction relation for language Lu,−n runs as follows.
Definition 7 (Satisfaction based on CXT,\ frames). Let M be a surjective model built on a CXT,\ frame.
M,w |= s iff I(s) = {w}
M,w |= [u]φ iff ∀w′ ∈ Wu: M,w′ |= φ
M,w |= [c]φ iff ∀w′ ∈ Wc: M,w′ |= φ
M,w |= [−c]φ iff ∀w′ ∈ W\Wc: M,w′ |= φ
where u is the universal context index and c ranges on the context indexes in C, and s is a nominal. The obvious
boolean clauses and the clauses for the dual modal operators are omitted.
Surjective models on CXT,\ frames will be referred to as CXT,\ models. The first clause states the satisfaction
relation for nominals: a nominal s is true in a state w in model M iff the evaluation function associates w to s.
Nominals are therefore objective formulae which are true in at most one world. The second clause, which was already
introduced in Definition 5, states that the [u] operator is interpreted on the universal frame contained in each CXT,\
frame. The third one is just the standard clause for contextual truth introduced in Definition 1. Finally, the last and new
clause states that the [−c] operators range over the complements of the sets Wc on which [c] operators range instead.
Some observations are in order. First of all, let us comment upon the semantics of the [−c]-operators. In fact, the
[c] operator specifies a lower bound on what holds in context c (‘something more may hold in c’), that is, a formula
[c]φ means that φ at least holds in context c. The [−c] operator, instead, specifies an upper bound on what holds in c
5 For this purpose nominals were first introduced by the so-called “Sofia school” of modal logic [7,21,22] in order to axiomatize the complement
and the intersection of accessibility relations, especially in a dynamic logic setting. In fact, the axiomatics we present in Section 6.3 is strictly
related with the systems studied in their works.
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in the complement of c. It becomes thus possible in CXT,\ frames to express context definitions by means of modal
Lu,−n formulae interpreted on CXT,\ models. A set of objective formulae Γ defines context c in a CXT,\ modelM
iff:
(27)M |= [c]Γ ∧ [−c]¬Γ
where ¬Γ has to be intended in the obvious sense of the disjunction of the negations of all formulae in Γ . Formula
(27) is an object language modal translation of the property stated in Formula (11).
Proposition 4 (Equivalence of Formulae (11) and (27)). Let M be a CXT model and M′ be a model on a CXT,\
frame such that: M′ is based on a frame having the same domain of the frame on which M is based, and which
contains all its contexts; propositional atoms get the same evaluation in M′ and M. It is the case that, given a set of
objective formulae Γ and a context Wc: M,w |= Γ iff w ∈ Wc is equivalent to M′ |= [c]Γ ∧ [−c]¬Γ .
Proof. The proof is based on the semantics provided in Definition 7. By construction of M′, the clause “if w ∈ Wc
thenM,w |= Γ ” is equivalent to “if w ∈ Wc thenM′,w |= Γ ”, and therefore equivalent toM′ |= [c]Γ . Analogously,
the clause “if w /∈ Wc then M,w |= Γ ” is equivalent to “if w ∈ W\Wc then M′,w |= ¬Γ ”, and therefore equivalent
to M′ |= [−c]¬Γ . 
In practice, we are making use, in a different setting but with similar purposes, of a well-known technique developed
in the modal logic of knowledge, i.e., the interpretation of modal operators on ‘inaccessible states’ typical, for instance,
of the “all that I know” epistemic logic [19]. In our case, the set of inaccessible states is nothing but the complement
of a context.
6.3. Axiomatics
To axiomatize the above semantics an extension of logic K45ijn is needed which can characterize nominals as names
for modal states and, consequently, context complementation. The extension, which we call logic Cxtu,−, results by
adding to Cxtu a group of two axioms (Least and Most) and one rule (Name) which axiomatize nominals, and a
group of two axioms (Covering and Packing) which axiomatize context complementation. The axiomatics runs
as follows:
(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
(Ki ) [i](φ1 → φ2) → ([i]φ1 → [i]φ2)
(4ij ) [i]φ → [j ][i]φ
(5ij ) ¬[i]φ → [j ]¬[i]φ
(Tu) [u]φ → φ
(⊆ .ui) [u]φ → [i]φ
(Least) 〈u〉ν
(Most) 〈u〉(ν ∧ φ) → [u](ν → φ)
(Covering) [c]φ ∧ [−c]φ → [u]φ
(Packing) 〈−c〉ν → ¬〈c〉ν
(Dual) 〈i〉φ ↔ ¬[i]¬φ
(Name) IF  ν → θ THEN  θ, for ν not occurring in θ
(MP) IF  φ1 AND  φ1 → φ2 THEN  φ2
(Ni ) IF  φ THEN  [i]φ
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the universal context index, ν ranges over nominals, and θ in rule Name denotes a formula in which the nominal
denoted by ν does not occur. The proofs of soundness and completeness of the axiomatization w.r.t. CXT,\ frames
are provided in Appendix A.
The new axioms and rules deserve some comments. Let us start with the axiomatization of nominals. Axiom
Least states just that every nominal denotes at least one state. Vice versa, axiom Most states that nominals denote
at most one state. Intuitively it says that, if there is a state named ν where φ holds, then φ holds if ν is the case. Finally,
rule Name is a rule with side conditions borrowed from standard hybrid logic [2]. It forces all states to be nominated.
It does that by saying that if it is provable that a formula θ holds at an arbitrary state ν—the state is arbitrary since
the rule requires ν not to occur in θ—then θ itself is provable since there is no world that falsifies it. From a technical
point of view, as observed in [7,21], this rule ensures that in any definable set of the model, i.e., set of states in which
some modal formula is true, at least one state can be picked which is named by NI . This guarantees function NI
to be a surjection on the set of all definable singletons of W .6 To sum up, axioms Least and Most with rule Name
axiomatize the conditions holding on the interpretation function I as exposed in Section 6.2.
Let us now discuss the axioms that are more central to the modeling aim we are pursuing: axioms Covering
and Packing. They characterize context complementation. Axiom Covering states that if some formula holds
in both c and −c, than it holds globally. To put it otherwise, it states that the universal context is covered by the
contexts denoted by c and, respectively, −c. Axiom Packing states then that the contexts denoted by c and −c
are strongly disjoint, in the sense that they do not contain the same states. They pack the universal context in two
disjoint subcontexts. Axioms Covering and Packing are therefore just modal formulations of the two properties
characterizing the bipartition of a given set. Notice that nominals are necessary in the formulation of the Packing
axiom. It is easy to see that, without the possibility of naming individual states, it would be impossible to axiomatize
disjointness.7
6.4. A remark: Cxtu,− as hybrid logic
Before putting the formalism at work, it might be instructive to make one last technical remark. In logic Cxtu,− a
family {@ν}ν∈N of operators is definable, by means of which it is possible to express that a formula φ holds in the
state named ν: @νφ. This operator is known in hybrid logics [2] as the satisfaction operator. Its semantics is given in
terms of the following clause:
M,w |= @νφ iff M,I(ν) |= φ.
The property of “holding in a state” is thus a global property, that is, it is independent of the point of evaluation. The
clause states more precisely that, whatever the state of evaluation is, it is the case that if s holds then φ also holds.
In fact, the satisfaction operator can be defined in any logic enabling nominals and a universal modality ([1,11]) as
follows:
(28)@νφ := [u](ν → φ)
where @ν is a nominal and φ a formula. Leaving technicalities aside, this means that logic Cxtu,− has sufficient
expressive means to represent statements of the type “in situation (or state) ν state-of-affairs φ holds”. This expressive
capability of logic Cxtu,− will turn out useful to represent intuitive reasoning patterns involving constitutive counts-as
statements (see Proposition 6).
Using a multi-modal logic Cxtu,− on a language Lu,−n , the constitutive reading of counts-as statements can now be
formalized.
Definition 8 (Constitutive counts-as: ⇒coc,Γ ). Given a set of formulae Γ such that γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ , the constitutive
counts-as statement “γ1 counts as γ2 in the context c defined by Γ ” is formalized in a multi-modal logic Cxtu,\ on
6 Rule Name plays a central role in the completeness proof for Cxtu,− (see the proof of Lemma 7 in Appendix A).
7 However, it is not our claim that nominals are the only viable way to achieve this aim. Another possible and probably more elegant solution
might consist in using the difference operator, by means of which it is possible to represent both the universal modality and nominals (see [2,7]).
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γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2 := [c]Γ ∧ [−c]¬Γ ∧ ¬[u](γ1 → γ2)
with γ1 and γ2 objective formulae.
The definition implements in modal logic the intuition summarized in Observation 2, and formalized in Def-
inition 4: constitutive counts-as statements correspond to those non trivial classifications which are stated by the
definition Γ of the context c. In fact the following can be proven.
Proposition 5 (Equivalence of Definitions 8 and 4). Let M be a CXT,\ frame and Γ a set of objective formulae.
It is the case that: γ1 → γ2 ∈ CO(Γ,Wc) iff γ1 → γ2 ∈ {γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ |M |= γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2 }. To put it otherwise:
CO(Γ,Wc) = {γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ |M |= γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2}.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 4 and Definition 8. 
A detailed comment of Definition 8 is in order. Its most important consequence is that it is possible to talk about
constitutive counts-as only once a set Γ is given. As already stressed in Section 2.3, there is no formula that is
constitutive in isolation from a set of rules.
Secondly, notice that a constitutive counts-as is false if either Γ does not define the context denoted by c, or if
it expresses a classification which is valid in the model. This is the distinctive feature of constitutive counts-as with
respect to its two classificatory relatives. While the classificatory versions of counts-as express what at least holds
in a context (contextual classification) and, respectively, what at least hold in a context which is not globally true
(proper contextual classification), the constitutive version expresses also what at most holds in a context, thereby
making explicit what the context actually is in terms of a set of formulae of the language. We can have a constitutive
counts-as statement only if it is known what the definition is of the context at issue. In the classificatory versions of
counts-as this knowledge is absent since it is only partially known what the context explicitly is. Classificatory and
proper classificatory counts-as statements presuppose the existence of a context of which only some information is
available. From a technical point of view, this linguistic dependence corresponds to the fact that γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2 formulae
are defined only for pairs of formulae (γ1, γ2) s.t. γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ . To put it another way, symbols ⇒coc,Γ are not genuine
connectives. As a consequence, it is not possible to study ⇒coc,Γ conditionals from a structural perspective like it has
been done for the other forms of counts-as in Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
How awkward this might sound it is perfectly aligned with the intuitions on the notion of constitution which
backed Definition 8: constitutive counts-as are those classifications which are explicitly stated in the specification of
the normative system. In a sense, constitutive statements are just given, and that is it. This does not mean, however,
that constitutive statements cannot be used to perform reasoning. The following example depicts the most typical form
of reasoning involving constitutive counts-as statements.
Proposition 6 (⇒coc,Γ and @ν). The following formula is valid in CXT,\ frames for any Γ containing γ1 → γ2:
(29)γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2 →
(
(@νΓ ∧ @νγ1) → @νγ2
)
.
Proof. Follows from Definition 4, Formula (28) and propositional logic. 
This property shows how constitutive rules work in providing grounds for inferring the occurrence of new states-
of-affairs: it is a rule of the normative system of Utrecht University that if the promotor pronounces the PhD student
to be a doctor then this counts as the PhD student to be a doctor (γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2); the current situation ν falls under the
rules of Utrecht University (@νΓ ) and in the current situation the promotor pronounces a PhD student to be a doctor
(@νγ1), hence in the current situation the PhD student is a doctor (@νγ2).
It is remarkable that Formula (29) perfectly depicts the notion of “conventional generation” as described in [10]:
“Act-token A of agent X conventionally generates act-token B [. . . ] only if the performance of A [. . . ], together
with a rule R saying that A [. . . ] counts as B, guarantees the performance of B” [10, p. 25].
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which states that situation ν is one of the situations in context c. Without the notion of context definition and the
availability of nominals, this could not be expressed.
Complex reasoning patterns involving constitutive counts-as statements arise also in relation with the other two
notions of counts-as. The following section investigates the logical relationships between the three different senses
of counts-as. Complex reasoning patterns involving constitutive counts-as statements arise also in relation with the
other two notions of counts-as. The following section investigates the logical relationships between the three different
senses of counts-as.
7. Relating the many faces of counts-as
This section is devoted to pursuing the last goal mentioned in the quote from [29] mentioned in Section 1: “and then
we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and
mutual relations.” The logical relations between ⇒coc,Γ , ⇒cl+c and ⇒clc can be studied in logic Cxtu,\ which extends
both K45ijn , i.e., the logic in which ⇒clc has been defined, and Cxtu, i.e., the logic in which ⇒cl+c has been defined.
Proposition 7 (⇒clc vs ⇒cl+c vs ⇒coc,Γ ). In logic Cxtu,\ the following formulae are valid:
(30)(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) → (γ1 ⇒clc γ2)
(31)(γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) → (γ1 ∧ γ3 ⇒clc γ2)
(32)((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ3)) → (γ1 ⇒clc γ3)
(33)(γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2) → (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2)
provided that γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ .
Proof. The validity of formula (30) follows directly from Definitions 2 and 6: (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ↔ (γ1 ⇒clc γ2 ∧¬[u](γ1 → γ2)).
The validity of formula (31) follows from the validity of formula (30), the validity of formula (8) for ⇒clc (Propo-
sition 1) and MP.
Finally, the validity of formula (32) follows also from the validity of formula (30), the validity of formula (6) of
⇒clc (Proposition 1) and MP. Formula (33) follows straightforwardly from Definition 8. 
Let us have a look at the intuitive meaning of the formulae just proven. Formula (30) states something very simple:
proper contextual classification implies contextual classification. This corresponds, in the model-theoretic notation
used in Section 4, to the following inclusion relation: CL+(Wc) ⊆ CL(Wc). Formulae (31) and (32) are particularly
interesting. If we forget that the two operators ⇒cl+c and ⇒clc denote two different notions and we read both expres-
sions γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2 and γ1 ⇒clc γ2 just as “γ1 counts as γ2”, these formulae would sound as statements of the property of
antecedent strengthening and of the transitivity of “counts-as”. However, our formal analysis based on the acknowl-
edgment of the polysemy of counts-as has shown that transitivity and antecedent strengthening hold for ⇒clc but not for⇒cl+c . On the other hand, and this is what Proposition 7 shows, their logical interactions display patterns clearly remi-
niscent of those properties. In a sense, it has been shown that questions such as “is transitivity an intuitive property for
a characterization of counts-as?” are flawed by the possibility of confusing under the label counts-as different notions
which enjoy different logical properties. More specifically, Formula (31) expresses that given a counts-as statement
interpreted as a proper classification, a contextual classification can be inferred having as antecedent a strengthened
version of the antecedent of the first statement, and this although proper contextual classification does not enjoy
antecedent strengthening. In other words, although ⇒cl+c does not enjoy antecedent strengthening, it is nonetheless
grounds for performing monotonic reasoning via ⇒clc . Analogous considerations apply to formula (32). Proper con-
textual classification does not enjoy transitivity but reasoning via transitivity remains valid shifting from ⇒cl+c to ⇒clc .
Finally, Formula (33) translates the following intuitive fact: the promulgation of a constitutive rule guarantees, to say
it with [18], the possibility of applying specific classificatory rules. If it is a rule of Γ that self-propelled conveyances
count as vehicles (constitutive sense) then self-propelled conveyances count as vehicles (proper classificatory sense)
in the context c defined by Γ .
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Proposition 8 (Impossibility of ⇒cl+u and ⇒cou,Γ ). Proper classificatory counts-as statements and constitutive counts-
as statements are impossible with respect to the universal context u. In symbols, the following formulae are valid in
CXT,\ frames:
(34)(γ1 ⇒cl+u γ2) → ⊥
(35)(γ1 ⇒cou,Γ γ2) → ⊥
for γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ .
Proof. The proposition is easily proven considering that Definition 6 yields that Formula (34) is equivalent to:
[u](γ1 → γ2) ∧ ¬[u](γ1 → γ2) which is, for Definition 8, implied also by Formula (35). 
Intuitively, Formula (34) expresses that what is considered to hold in general is not the product of constitution, it
is just, so to say, what is taken to be necessarily the case. Formula (35) states something slightly different, although
much related: the global context u is not constituted by any set of rules Γ . To put it another way, what Formulae
(34) and (35) say is that the global context u is what sets the boundaries of the possible constitutions. Notice that
contextual classificatory statements are instead perfectly sound also with respect to the universal context. In fact,
formula γ1 ⇒clu γ2 is satisfiable in CXT,\ models.
Proposition 9 (Impossibility of ⇒cl+c and ⇒coc,Γ ). Global truths can not be the content of proper classificatory counts-
as or constitutive counts-as statements. In symbols, the following formulae are valid in CXT,\ frames:
(36)[u](γ1 → γ2) → ((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) → ⊥)
(37)[u](γ1 → γ2) → ((γ1 ⇒coc,Γ γ2) → ⊥)
for γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ .
Proof. The proposition follow directly from Definitions 6 and 8. From Definition 6 it follows that Formula (36)
implies: [u](γ1 → γ2) ∧ ¬[u](γ1 → γ2). The same follows from Definition 8, which proves Formula (37). 
Formulae (36) and (37) express that what is taken to be globally the case can not be a proper contextual classifi-
cation and can not be used to constitute a context. The reason for this is that global truths hold in all contexts, and
therefore, they can not be specific of any one. To put it in yet another way, if something is considered to be a proper
contextual counts-as or a constitutive one, then it is also presupposed that what stated by the counts-as can possibly
not be the case. For instance, if we take “apples are fruits” to be a global truth of our reality, then “apples count as
fruits” can not be a constitutive rule since it adds nothing to what is already the case. On the contrary, if we take
“apples count as fruits” to be one of the constitutive rules of a system Γ then we are assuming that in some cases
apples are not classified as fruits.
Let us now take into consideration properties displaying more complex reasoning patterns.
Proposition 10 (From ⇒coc,Γ to ⇒clc and ⇒cl+c via ⇒clu ). The following formulae are valid in CXT,\ frames:
(38)(γ2 ⇒coc,Γ γ3) →
(
(γ1 ⇒clu γ2) → (γ1 ⇒clc γ3)
)
(39)(γ2 ⇒coc,Γ γ3) →
((
(γ1 ⇒clu γ2) ∧ ¬[u](γ1 → γ3)
) → (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3))
provided that γ1 → γ2 ∈ Γ .
Proof. The proof of Formula (38) is straightforward from Definitions 2, 8, Proposition 3 and the transitivity of clas-
sificatory counts-as (Proposition 1). Formula (39) is proven by just adding the application of Definition 6 to the proof
of Formula (38). 
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a rule of Γ that γ2 → γ3 (“self-propelled conveyances count as vehicles”) and it is always the case that γ1 → γ2
(“cars count as self-propelled conveyances”), then γ1 → γ3 (“cars count as vehicles”) holds in the context c defined
by normative system Γ . Formula (39): if it is a rule of Γ that γ2 → γ3 (“conveyances transporting people or goods
count as vehicles”) and it is always the case that γ1 → γ2 (“bikes count as conveyances transporting people or goods”)
but it is not always the case that γ1 → γ3 (“bikes count as vehicles”), then γ1 → γ3 (“bikes count as vehicles”) holds
as a constituted classification in the context c defined by normative system Γ . Notice that while “cars count as self-
propelled conveyances” is a classificatory counts-as, since it might still be the case that cars are globally classified
as vehicles, “bikes count as vehicles” is instead a proper classificatory counts-as since it is explicitly stated that such
classification is not a validity. Formula (39) represents nothing but the form of the reasoning pattern that has been used
as example in Section 2.3 to introduce the notion of constitution.
The remarkable aspect about these properties is that they neatly show how the three senses of counts-as all play a
role in the kind of reasoning we perform with constitutive rules. In particular, they show that the constitutive sense,
though not enjoying any structural property, grounds in fact all the rich reasoning patterns proper of classificatory
reasoning.
7.1. The transfer problem in the light of ⇒clc , ⇒cl+c and ⇒coc,Γ
The ‘transfer problem’ has been introduced in [18] as a landmark for testing the intuitive adequacy of formalizations
of counts-as. It can be exemplified as follows: suppose that somebody brings it about—for instance by coercion—that
a priest effectuates a marriage, does this count as the creation of a state of marriage? Does anything implying that a
priest effectuates a marriage count as the creation of a state of marriage? In other words, is the possibility to create
a marriage transferable to anybody who brings it about that the priest effectuates the ceremony? In our framework,
these questions get a triple formulation, one for each of the different senses of counts-as.
The transfer problem and ⇒clc . In [18], the transfer problem has been used as grounds for the rejection of the
property of antecedent strengthening for counts-as conditionals. It is beyond doubt that a characterization of counts-as
which enjoys the strengthening of the antecedent also exhibits the transfer problem: if that property holds, then the
fact that the performance of the ceremony counts as the creation of a state of marriage implies that also a coerced
performance does. As already noticed in [15], contextual classification (⇒clc ), which enjoys the strengthening of the
antecedent (Proposition 1), does exhibit the transfer problem: whatever situation in which a priest performs a marriage
ceremony is classified as a situation in which a marriage state comes to be. And this is precisely what we intuitively
expect given the notion of contextual classification as informally introduced in Section 2. In other words, contextual
classification should exhibit the transfer problem or, to put it another way, it should display a transfer property: the
creation of a state of marriage is transferable to any state in which a priest performs the appropriate ceremony.
The transfer problem and ⇒cl+c . It has been shown that the characterization of proper contextual classification
(⇒cl+c ) does not enjoy the strengthening of the antecedent (Proposition 2). From a mere conditional logic perspective,
such as the one assumed in [18], this would be enough to rule out the occurrence of the transfer problem.
However, it seems this is quite not the case, the reason being that the transfer problem has manifestations which
go beyond the structural rule of antecedent strengthening. The following formula, proven valid in Proposition 3, also
expresses an instance of the transfer problem: ¬[u](γ1 → γ3) → ((γ1 ⇒cl+c γ2) ∧ (γ2 ⇒cl+c γ3)) → (γ1 ⇒cl+c γ3).
Intuitively, if the fact that a priest effectuates a marriage (γ1) under coercion of a third party (γ3) is not globally
classified as giving rise to a state of marriage (γ2)—which is the case, given the intuitive reading of the scenario at
issue—then it is safe to say that if the priest’s performance of the marriage counts as (in a proper classificatory sense)
a marriage, then a coerced performance of the marriage counts also as a marriage.
Notice that this is again something perfectly intuitive given the assumptions about proper contextual classification
exposed in Section 4: if a context c makes a classification γ1 → γ2 true, which does not hold in general, then also the
strengthened version of it, i.e., γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2, is true in that context. Besides, if the strengthened version is also not
true in general, it then follows that γ1 ∧ γ3 → γ2 is also a novel classification which is brought about by context c.
Exhibiting the transfer problem is also for proper contextual classification not problematic.
From a technical point of view, Proposition 3 shows that a characterization of counts-as, which does not enjoy
the strengthening of the antecedent, can still exhibit the transfer problem. This is a point worth stressing because, by
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in the above formula could simply not be expressed.
To conclude, proper contextual classification does not exhibit the transfer problem, if by “transfer problem” we just
mean the rejection of antecedent strengthening, like it was proposed in [18]. On the other hand, if we consider broader
forms of the problem which did not get a formulation in [18], then proper contextual classification does exhibit it.
The transfer problem and ⇒coc,Γ . The constitutive reading of counts-as statements does not exhibit any of the
considered forms of the transfer problem. Counts-as statements represent the rules specifying a normative system. So,
all that it is explicitly stated by the ‘institution of marriage’ is that if the priest performs the ceremony then the couple
is married. No rule belongs to that institution which states that the action of a third party bringing it about that the
priest performs the ceremony also counts as a marriage. Our formalization fully captures this feature. Let the ‘marriage
institution’ c be represented by the set of rules Γ = {p → m}, i.e., by the rule “if the priest performs the ceremony,
then the couple is married”. Let then t represent the fact that a third party brings it about that p. For Definition 8 the
counts-as (t ∧ p) ⇒coc,Γ m is just an undefined expression, because ((t ∧ p) → m) /∈ Γ , that is, because the ‘marriage
institution’ does not state such a classification.
8. Conclusions
Moving from hints provided by the literature on legal and social theory concerning constitutive rules, the paper has
analyzed counts-as statements as forms of contextual classifications. This analytical option, which we have studied
from a formal semantics perspective, has delivered three semantically precise senses (Definitions 2, 6 and 8) in which
counts-as statements can be interpreted, which we called classificatory, proper classificatory and constitutive readings.
The three readings have then been formally analyzed making use of modal logic.
The classificatory reading resulted in a strong logic of counts-as conditionals enabling many properties which are
typical of reasoning with concept subsumptions such as, in particular, reflexivity, strengthening of the antecedent and
weakening of the consequent (Proposition 1). In fact, the logic obtained is nothing but a modal logic version of the
contextual terminological logic we investigated in [12,13].
The characterization of proper contextual classification resulted, instead, in a much weaker logic rejecting reflex-
ivity, transitivity and antecedent strengthening (Proposition 2), but retaining cumulative transitivity (Proposition 3).
Noticeably, this notion corresponds to the counts-as characterized in [18] once transitivity is substituted with cumu-
lative transitivity. Finally, the notion of proper contextual classification has offered some new insights on the transfer
problem (Section 7.1) showing that it cannot be genuinely avoided just by means of rejecting the strengthening of the
antecedent in a conditional logic setting. This result motivated the investigation of a yet stronger form of counts-as
which we developed in [14], and which stems nevertheless from the same analytical option backing the present work.
The formal analysis of constitutive counts-as (Definition 8) has neatly shown, with formal means, in what sense
constitutive rules are never constitutive in isolation, but only as parts of systems of rules, and how constitutive rules
work in providing grounds for attributing institutional properties to situations (Proposition 6). Constitutive counts-as
has also been shown to imply the two classificatory readings (Proposition 7). Other logical interrelationships between
the three notions of counts-as have also been studied (Propositions 8 and 10) showing also that the logical relations
between them could actually be grounds for fallacies in the formal characterization of counts-as once the polysemy of
the term “counts-as” is overlooked.
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Appendix A. Soundness and completeness
This appendix proves soundness and completeness of the logics we have introduced for the analysis of counts-as:
K45ijn , Cxtu and Cxtu,−. The strong completeness of these logics will be proven via the canonical model technique.
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Logics K45ijn and Cxtu are normal modal logics, i.e., the axiomatization of every modality [i] contains all tau-
tologies of propositional calculus, axiom K and is closed under rules MP and N. A normal modal logic Λ is strongly
complete w.r.t. a class F of frames if for any set of formulae Φ and formula φ, if Φ semantically entails φ then φ is
derivable from Φ in Λ: if Φ |=F φ then Φ Λ φ.
First, some well-known definitions and general results about modal completeness theory of normal modal logics
are listed. We refer the reader to [2] for further details.
Let us, first of all, recall some facts about maximal consistent sets. Let Λ be a multi-modal normal logic. A maximal
Λ-consistent set of formulae on a multi-modal language Ln is a set Φ s.t.: (a) ⊥ is not derivable in Λ from Φ (i.e.,
Λ-consistency of Φ); (b) every set properly including Φ is Λ-inconsistent. Every maximal Λ-consistent set Φ is such
that: Λ ⊆ Φ; Φ is closed under rule MP; for all formulae φ either φ ∈ Φ or ¬φ ∈ Φ; for all formulae φ,ψ : φ ∨ψ ∈ Φ
iff φ ∈ Φ or ψ ∈ Φ . We can now report the notion of canonical model for a logic Λ.
Definition 9 (Canonical model for logic Λ). The canonical modelMΛ for a normal modal logic Λ in the multi-modal
language Ln is the structure 〈WΛ, {RΛi }1in,IΛ〉 where: 1) The set WΛ is the set of all maximal Λ-consistent sets;
2) The canonical relations {RΛi }1in are defined as follows: for all w,w′ ∈ WΛ, if for all formulae φ, φ ∈ w′ implies
〈i〉φ ∈ w, then wRΛi w′; 3) The canonical interpretation IΛ is defined by IΛ(p) = {w ∈ WΛ | p ∈ w}.
We briefly recall four key propositions of (modal) completeness theory. For the proofs we refer the reader to [2].
Proposition 11 (Redefining strong completeness). A normal modal logic Λ is strongly complete w.r.t. a class of frames
F iff every Λ-consistent set of formulae is satisfiable on some F ∈ F, i.e., it has a model M built on a frame F in
class F.
Lemma 1 (Existence Lemma). For any normal modal logic Λ and any state w ∈ WΛ, it holds that: if 〈i〉φ ∈ w then
there exists a state w′ ∈ WΛ such that wRΛi w′ and φ ∈ w′.
Lemma 2 (Truth Lemma). For any normal modal logic Λ and any formula φ, it holds that: MΛ,w |= φ iff φ ∈ w.
We will also make use of the notion of point-generated subframe. Given a frame F = 〈W, {Ri}1in}〉, a point-
generated subframe Fw of the frame F is a structure 〈Ww, {Rwi }1in}〉 such that: (a) Ww is the set of states w′ ∈ W
such that there exists, for any Ri , a finite Ri -path from w to w′; (b) Rwi = Ri ∩ (Ww × Ww), i.e., each Rwi is the
restriction of Ri on Ww . We will refer to the set of states which are accessible from a state w via a relation Rwi as the
set rwi (w). The following result is of interest.
Lemma 3 (Generated subframes preserve validity). Let F be a class of frames and g(F) be the class of point-generated
subframes of the frames in F. It holds that, for all formulae φ on language Ln: F |= φ iff g(F) |= φ.
Finally, we need a way to relate context frames (see Section 3.1), that is, structures of the type 〈W, {Wi}i∈C〉 with
relational structures of the type 〈W, {Ri}i∈C〉. The bridge is offered by locally universal relations. A relation Ri on
a set W is locally universal if: 1) for all Ri ∈ {Ri}i∈C and w ∈ W , Ri is universal on ri(w); 2) for all w,w′ ∈ W ,
ri(w) = ri(w′), where ri is a function associating to each state w the set of reachable states via relation Ri .
The following representation result holds for this family of relations.
Lemma 4 (Representation of context frames). A relation Ri on W is locally universal iff there exists a set Wi ⊆ W
such that for all w,w′, wRiw′ iff w′ ∈ Wi .
Proof. The right to left direction is straightforward. From left to right: for every w,w′ ∈ W it holds, by the definition
of function r that wRiw′ iff w′ ∈ ri(w). Since Ri is locally universal, it holds that for every w,w′′ ∈ W , ri(w) =
ri(w
′′). It is now enough to stipulate Wi = ri(w′′) for any w′′ to obtain the desired result: there exists a set Wi ⊆ W
such that for all w,w′, wRiw′ iff w′ ∈ Wi . 
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sets of worlds (contexts), one for each accessibility relation, and then defines these accessibility relations in such a
way that the sets of accessible worlds correspond, for each world in W , to the clusters.
Completeness of K45ijn and Cxtu is sketched in Section A.3. The more interesting proof of completeness for logic
Cxtu,− is instead extensively exposed.
A.2. Logic Cxtu,−
Instead, logic Cxtu,− is quite more than a normal modal logic. It is built on a language containing a set N of
nominals (Lu,−n , see Section 6.1), its axiomatics contains rule Name (see Section 6.3), and its models state conditions
on the possible valuations of one type of propositional variables in the language, i.e., the nominals (see Section 6.2).
Let us call modal logics with names the normal modal logics on a language Ln with nominals extended with rule
Name, axioms Most and Least and the axioms of the universal modality [u]. In the case of modal logics with
names, strong completeness should be redefined as follows. Let Λ be a modal logic with names. Logic Λ is strongly
complete w.r.t. the class F of frames if for any set of formulae Φ and formula φ, if Φ semantically entails φ in all
surjective models (see Section 6.2) built on a frame in F then φ is derivable from Φ in Λ: if Φ |=F φ then Φ Λ φ.
Proposition 11 should now be restated for modal logics with names.
Proposition 12 (Redefining strong completeness for modal logics with names). A modal logic Λ with names is strongly
complete w.r.t. the class of frames F iff every Λ-consistent set Φ of formulae is satisfiable on some surjective model
built on a frame in class F.
Proof. [⇐] From right to left we argue by contraposition. If Λ is not strongly complete w.r.t. the class F then there
exists a set of formulae Φ ∪ {φ} s.t. Φ |=F φ and Φ Λ φ. It follows that Φ ∪ {¬φ} is Λ-consistent but not satisfiable
on any surjective model built on a frame in class F. [⇒] From left to right we argue per absurdum. Let us assume
that Φ ∪ {¬φ} is Λ-consistent but not satisfiable in any surjective model built on a frame in class F. It follows that
Φ |=F φ and hence Φ ∪ {¬φ} is not Λ-consistent, which is impossible. 
Strong completeness of logic Cxtu,− is dealt with in Section A.4, which relies on general results exposed in [7]
and [2].
A.3. Soundness and completeness of K45ijn and Cxtu
Let us start with K45ijn . The proof of soundness is routinary. It is well-known that inference rules MP and N preserve
validity on any class of frames. Providing the soundness of K45ijn w.r.t. CXT frames boils than down to checking the
validity of axioms 4ij and 5ij , which is easily obtained by showing that their contrapositives have no countermodels.
As to completeness, the desired result is obtained in two steps: 1) First, via the canonical model, it is proven
that logic K45ijn is complete with respect to the class of i-j transitive (if wRiw′ and w′Rjw′′ then wRjw′′), and i-j
euclidean (if wRiw′ and wRjw′′ then w′Rjw′′) frames; 2) Second, it is proven that if TE is the class of i-j transitive
and i-j euclidean frames, then for every φ ∈ Ln: TE |= φ iff CXT |= φ.
Theorem 1 (Completeness of K45ijn ). Logic K45ijn is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of i-j transitive and i-j euclidean
frames.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 11, Lemma 2 and by proving that the canonical model of logic K45ijn enjoys i-j
transitivity and i-j euclidicity, which is straightforward. 
Lemma 5 (Semantic equivalence for CXT frames). Consider the class TE of i-j transitive and i-j euclidean frames.
For every φ ∈ Ln, TE |= φ iff CXT |= φ. That is, CXT frames and TE frames define the same logic.
Proof. [⇐] It follows from Proposition 4. [⇒] It follows from Lemma 3 and Proposition 4. 
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frames.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1 and Lemma 5. 
Let us now consider Cxtu. On the grounds of the previous results, the proof of soundness and completeness of
Cxtu w.r.t. CXT can be easily obtained. Soundness boils down to prove that axioms Tu and ⊆ .ui are valid in Cxtu
frames, which is trivial given that the [u]-operator is interpreted as universal quantification on all the states in the
domain W .
For completeness, let TE∼ be the class of frames satisfying the following properties: they are i-j transitive, i-j
euclidean; they contain an equivalence relation Ru such that for all i ∈ C, Ri ⊆ Ru. Again, completeness w.r.t. the
relevant class of frames is proven in two steps.
1. Logic Cxtu is first proven to be complete w.r.t. the class of TE∼ frames.
2. It is then proven that for any formula φ on Ln: TE∼ |= φ iff CXT |= φ.
Theorem 2 (Completeness of Cxtu). Logic Cxtu is strongly complete w.r.t. the class TE∼ frames.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 11, Lemma 2 and by proving that the canonical model of logic Cxtu contains a




u , which is
straightforward. 
Lemma 6 (Semantic equivalence for CXT frames). For any formula φ on Ln: TE∼ |= φ iff CXT |= φ. That is,
CXT frames and TE∼ frames define the same logic.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5. [⇐] It follows from Proposition 4. [⇒] It follows from
Lemmas 3, 5 and Proposition 4. 
Corollary 2 (Completeness of Cxtu w.r.t. CXT frames). Logic Cxtu is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of CXT
frames.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 2 and Lemma 6. 
A.4. Soundness and completeness of Cxtu,−
We prove soundness.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of Cxtu,− w.r.t. CXT,\ frames). Logic Cxtu is sound w.r.t. the class of CXT,\ frames.
Proof. It suffices to show that axioms Covering and Packing are valid in CXT,\ frames by just noticing that in
CXT,\ frames, for any atomic context index c, family {Wc,W−c} is a bipartition of the domain W : W ⊆ Wc ∪ W−c,
i.e., family {Wc,W−c} is a covering of W ; and Wc ∩ W−c = ∅, i.e., {Wc,W−c} is a packing of W . 
Let TE,\ be the class of frames satisfying the following properties: they are i-j transitive, i-j euclidean; they
contain a universal relation Ru; the set of relations {Ri}i∈C is such that, for any atomic context index c and states
w,w′ ∈ W : wRuw′ implies wRcw′ or wR−cw′; and wRcw′ implies not wR−cw′. Again, completeness w.r.t. the
CXT,\ frames is proven in two steps.
1. Logic Cxtu,− is first proven to be complete w.r.t. the class of TE,\ frames.
2. It is then proven that for any formula φ on Lu,−n : TE,\ |= φ iff CXT,\ |= φ.
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language, and of rule Name in the axiomatics, the standard techniques for normal modal logics need to be extended.
In particular, its canonical model should be built on maximal consistent named sets. The general definition is the
following one. Let Λ be a given logic on a multi-modal language Ln with nominals. A maximal Λ-consistent named
set of formulae of the multi-modal language Ln with nominals is a set Φ s.t.: (a) ⊥ is not derivable in Λ from Φ
(i.e., Λ-consistency of Φ); (b) every set properly including Φ is Λ-inconsistent. Every maximal Λ-consistent set Φ is
such that: Λ ⊆ Φ; Φ is closed under rule MP and Name; for all formulae φ either φ ∈ Φ or ¬φ ∈ Φ; for all formulae
φ,ψ : φ ∨ ψ ∈ Φ iff φ ∈ Φ or ψ ∈ Φ .
Lemma 7 (Maximal Λ-consistent named sets). Maximal Λ-consistent named sets always contain at least one nominal.
Proof. Let Φ be a maximal Λ-consistent set of formulae on Ln with nominals. Suppose per absurdum that ∀ν ∈ N,
¬ν ∈ Φ . It follows that for every ν there exists a finite conjunction θ of formulae from Φ such that:  ν → ¬θ .
Now, either ν occurs in θ and thus ν ∈ Φ , or ν does not occur in θ and therefore, by rule Name, ¬θ ∈ Φ which is
impossible. 
Obviously, the standard properties of maximal Λ-consistent sets still obtain. The canonical model of Cxtu,− should
be built with maximal Cxtu,−-consistent named sets. In addition, the canonical model should be surjective. The
following results show how this can be done.
Consider, first of all, that since logic Cxtu,− extends logic Cxtu, we know by Theorem 2 that the canonical model




u . Recall also
that every equivalence relation yields a partition on its domain. The clusters of the partition yielded by RCxtu,−u on
WCxt
u,−
containing state w is denoted as the set rCxtu,−u (w).
Lemma 8 (Maximal Cxtu,−-consistent named sets). The following facts hold for maximal Cxtu,−-consistent named
sets:
1. Each nominal in N is contained in at least one maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set.
2. If a nominal is contained in a maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set w ∈ WCxtu,− then it is not contained in any other
maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set w′ ∈ WCxtu,− which is accessible from w via RCxtu,−u . In other words, if two
maximal Cxtu,−-consistent sets contain the same nominal, and belong to the same cluster of the partition of
WCxt
u,−
yielded by RCxtu,−u , then they are the same set.
Proof. Clause 1 follows easily from Lemma 1 and the fact that every state w ∈ WCxtu,− contains formula 〈u〉ν (axiom
Least). Clause 2 is proven in two steps. (a) Given a nominal ν ∈ Φ , for any maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set Φ it
is proven that for all φ: φ ∈ Φ iff [u](ν → φ) ∈ Φ . (b) Given two maximal Cxtu,−-consistent sets Φ and Φ ′, if
ν ∈ Φ,Φ ′ and ΦRCxtu,−u Φ ′ then Φ = Φ ′. Let us prove (a). From left to right. We assumed a nominal ν ∈ Φ , hence
if φ ∈ Φ then ν ∧ φ ∈ Φ , being Φ a maximal Cxtu,−-consistent set. The set Φ also contains formula φ → 〈u〉φ
(i.e., the contrapositive of axiom Tu) and 〈u〉(ν ∧ φ) → [u](ν → φ) (i.e., axiom Most) from which it follows that
〈u〉(ν ∧ φ) ∈ Φ and hence that [u](ν → φ) ∈ Φ . From right to left: for any φ ∈ Φ , if [u](ν → φ) ∈ Φ then by axiom
Tu we obtain ν → φ ∈ Φ and then by MP φ ∈ Φ . Let us prove (b) per absurdum. Suppose Φ = Φ ′. Then there should




′ we obtain that ν → φ ∈ Φ ′ and via MP φ ∈ Φ ′, which is impossible. 
Clause 1 just states that all nominals get a denotation, that is to say, the interpretation function from nominals
to singletons is defined on every nominal. Clause 2 is particularly interesting. It states that the same nominal can in
fact belong to different maximal Cxtu,−-consistent sets if these sets are not related via RCxtu,−u . To put it otherwise,
nominals behave as real names if they refer to sets in a same cluster in the partition yielded by RCxtu,−u . It follows that
interpreting nominals on a generated frame corresponding to some cluster rCxtu,−u (w) ensures that they will behave
like names.






where: 1) Set WCxtu,− is the set of maximal Cxtu,−-consistent named sets which are [u]-connected to a given maximal
Cxtu,−-consistent named set w, that is: WCxtu,− = {w′ | {φ | [u]φ ∈ w} ⊆ w′}; 2) The canonical relations {RCxtu,−i }i∈C
and interpretation ICxtu,− are defined as in Definition 9.
It can now be shown that nominals behave like proper names since they all denote one and only one element in
WCxt
u,−
. The canonical model of Cxtu,− is therefore surjective.
Corollary 3 (Nominals are names in MCxtu,− ). Let MCxtu,− = 〈WCxtu,− , {RCxtu,−i }i∈C,ICxt
u,−〉 be the canonical
model of logic Cxtu,−. It is the case that: for every nominal ν, ICxtu,−(ν) is the only element of WCxtu,− containing ν.
Proof. It follows directly from Definition 10, Lemmata 7, 8. 
Now, what we still miss is a new version of the truth lemma (Lemma 2). In effect, this boils down to prove that
there are enough maximal Cxtu,−-consistent named sets to support an existence lemma (Lemma 1).
Lemma 9 (Truth Lemma for logic Cxtu,−). Let MCxtu,− = 〈WCxtu,− , {RCxtu,−i }i∈C,ICxt
u,−〉 be the canonical model
of logic Cxtu,−. It holds that: MCxtu,− ,w |= φ iff φ ∈ w.
Proof. The proof is, as usual, on the complexity of φ. The interesting case concerns modalities. It needs to be proven
that if 〈i〉φ ∈ w then there exists a state w′ ∈ WCxtu,− such that wRCxtu,−i w′ and φ ∈ w′. This can be shown as usual
by building w′ on the set {ψ | [i]ψ ∈ w} ∪ {φ}. Such set can be proven consistent in the usual way. What matters here,
is to prove that {ψ | [i]ψ ∈ w} contains at least one nominal since, as a result, w′ will be named. The desired fact is
proven per absurdum like in the proof of Lemma 7 using rule Name. Hence, set {ψ | [i]ψ ∈ w} ∪ {φ} is consistent and
named, therefore, it can be extended to the desired w′. 
We can now prove strong completeness with respect to TE,\ frames.
Theorem 4 (Completeness of Cxtu,−). Logic Cxtu,− is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of TE,\ frames, that is,
frames satisfying the following clauses:
1. They are i-j transitive, i-j euclidean.
2. They contain a universal relation Ru.
3. The set of relations {Ri}i∈C is such that, for any atomic context index c and states w,w′ ∈ W : (3.a) wRuw′
implies wRcw′ or wR−cw′; and (3.b) wR−cw′ implies not wRcw′.
Proof. By Proposition 12, given a Cxtu,−-consistent set Φ of formulae, it suffices to find a model state pair (M,w)
such that: (a) M,w |= Φ , and (b) the frame F on which M is based satisfies Clauses 1–3 and M is surjec-
tive. Claim (a) is proven by making use of Lemma 9. As to claim (b), it follows from Corollary 3 that model
〈WCxtu,− , {RCxtu,−i }i∈C,ICxt
u,−〉 is surjective. It remains to be proven that the frame 〈WCxtu,− , {RCxtu,−i }i∈C〉 of the
canonical model satisfies Clauses 1–3. Clause 1 and Clause 2 are proven to be satisfied by Theorem 2 since Cxtu,−
extends K45ijn and Cxtu and by considering that the frame of the canonical model is generated. Claims (3.a) and
(3.b) of clause 3 remain to be proven. To prove claim (3.a) it has to be shown that: for any atomic context index c
and states w,w′ ∈ WCxtu,− , wRCxtu,−u w′ implies wRCxtu,−c w′ or wRCxt
u,−
−c w′. Consider two states w,w′ ∈ WCxtu,−
such that wRCxtu,−u w′ and suppose that φ ∈ w′. Since w is a maximal Cxtu,−-consistent named set, it contains for-
mula 〈u〉φ → (〈c〉φ ∨ 〈−c〉φ) (i.e., the contrapositive of axiom Covering) and therefore 〈c〉φ ∨ 〈−c〉φ ∈ w. For the
properties of maximal consistent sets it follows that either 〈c〉φ ∈ w or 〈−c〉φ ∈ w, and hence by Definition 10, either
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c w
′ or wRCxtu,−−c w′, which proves (3.a). As to (3.b), it should be proven that for any atomic context index c and
states w,w′ ∈ WCxtu,− , wRCxtu,−−c w′ implies not wRCxtu,−c w′. Suppose that wRCxt
u,−
−c w′. By Clause 1 in Lemma 8 we
know that w′ should contain at least one nominal. Suppose it to be ν. By Clause 2 of this theorem, from wRCxtu,−−c w′ it
follows that wRCxtu,−u w′ and from this, by Clause 2 in Lemma 8, we know that there is no w′′ ∈ rCxtu,−u (w) such that
ν ∈ w′′. By Definition 10 it follows that 〈−c〉ν ∈ w. Now, w is a maximal Cxtu,−-consistent named set and it contains





, which proves claim (3.b). 
Lemma 10 (Semantic equivalence for CXT,\ frames). For any formula φ on Lu,−n : TE,\ |= φ iff CXT,\ |= φ. That
is, CXT,\ frames and TE,\ frames define the same logic.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proofs of Lemmata 5 and 6. [⇐] From right to left: for every φ, CXT,\ |= φ
implies TE,\ |= φ. The results follow by the application of Proposition 4. From W = Wc ∪ W−c for any atomic
context identifier c, it follows that for every w,w′ ∈ W , wRuw′ implies wRcw′ or wR−cw′. And from Wc ∩W−c = ∅
for any atomic context identifier c, it follows that for every w,w′ ∈ W , wR−cw′ implies not wRcw′. [⇒] From left
to right: for every φ, TE,\ |= φ implies CXT,\ |= φ. Frames in TE,\ already contain a universal relation. It just
needs to be shown that for any atomic index c: (a) Ww ⊆ rc(w) ∪ r−c(w) and (b) rc(w) ∩ r−c(w) ⊆ ∅. Both claims
are straightforwardly proven by observing that for any atomic context index c and states w′,w′′ ∈ Ww: w′Rwu w′′ (i.e.,
w′′ ∈ Ww ) implies w′Rwc w′′ (i.e., w′′ ∈ rc(w) ) or w′Rw−cw′′ (i.e., w′′ ∈ r−c(w)); and w′Rwc w′′ (i.e., w′′ ∈ rc(w))
implies not w′Rw−cw′′ (i.e., w′′ /∈ r−c(w)). 
Corollary 4 (Completeness of Cxtu,− w.r.t. CXT,\ frames). Logic Cxtu,− is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of
CXT,\ frames.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 4 and Lemma 10. 
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